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SUMMARY
As a result of significant policy changes, India has begun in 
recent years to advocate its increasing integration into the 
existing nuclear non-proliferation regime as a nuclear-
weapon state, thus challenging fundamental regime rules. 
As a consequence, India has turned into a serious test case 
for the European Union (EU) and the credibility of its 
emerging non-proliferation policy based on the promotion 
and strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. 
In essence, the EU is faced with a normative dilemma in the 
implementation of its policy of ‘effective multilateralism’: 
between adhering to the non-proliferation rules set out by 
EU member states in 2003 and reinforced in 2008, and the 
need to integrate a dissatisfied emerging power within 
multilateral structures. 
This paper argues that the record so far demonstrates 
the potential to establish a pragmatic common European 
line, which would strengthen the European position in the 
dialogues and negotiations with India on nuclear matters. 
More specifically, EU member states should recognize that 
the nuclear non-proliferation regime could be made more 
effective by including India, but only on the condition that 
it strengthens its commitment to elements of the regime 
that also impose significant costs, in particular the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
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INTEGRATING WITHOUT QUITE BREAKING THE 
RULES: THE EU AND INDIA’S ACCEPTANCE 
WITHIN THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
benjamin kienzle
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past ten years (or more) India has been a 
frequent source of controversy in the non-proliferation 
community. In particular, the controversial decision 
by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to allow nuclear 
exports to India—despite the fact that India developed 
a nuclear weapon capability outside the existing 
international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and 
that proliferation-sensitive parts of the Indian nuclear 
fuel cycle remain outside International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) safeguards—has been a hotly debated 
topic. In reality, however, the waiver was just a 
reflection of a much broader issue: how to integrate an 
emerging power within a multilateral system that was 
not designed to absorb it in the first place. 
Since the NSG waiver merely postponed rather 
than resolved this fundamental issue, debates about 
India’s complex relationship with the international 
non-proliferation regime will continue for years to 
come. The European Union (EU) and its member states 
are likely to play a key role in these debates, for three 
reasons. First, the EU has become a self-declared 
champion of the international non-proliferation 
regime, kick-starting its non-proliferation policy with 
the 2003 EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction (WMD Strategy). Consequently, 
any development that affects the regime’s fundamental 
structure is a key concern for the EU. Second, EU 
member states are integral members of virtually all 
institutions and treaties of the international non-
proliferation regime. Thus, they have an important say 
regarding all matters affecting India’s participation.1 
Third, the EU and its member states have close and 
1  Kienzle, B. and Vestergaard, C., ‘The non-proliferation regime’, 
eds K-E. Jørgensen and K. V. Laatikainen, Routledge Handbook on the 
European Union and International Institutions (Routledge: Abingdon, 
2013), pp. 371–88.
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long-established relations with India itself, which 
makes it particularly difficult to ignore a key issue 
such as India’s integration into the non-proliferation 
regime.2
This paper examines India’s complex and 
controversial relationship with the international 
nuclear non-proliferation regime from a broader 
perspective and describes how the EU and its member 
states have responded to India’s challenge of the regime 
over time. It argues that the EU is confronted with a 
dilemma encapsulated in different interpretations of 
its mantra of ‘effective multilateralism’: it can either 
uphold the principle of multilateralism against all 
changes that India’s integration into the existing 
non-proliferation regime entails, including the 
universalization of all regime treaties, as originally 
agreed to by member states in the 2003 WMD Strategy 
and the 2008 update; or it can follow those who argue 
that a multilateral regime becomes more effective by 
including powerful outliers in the regime, even if this 
circumvents existing multilateral principles. Although 
EU member states have been far from united in this 
respect, European responses so far suggest that they 
ultimately tend to the latter option. Finally, this insight 
will allow the exploration of possible European policy 
options for the future.
II. INDIA AND THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION 
REGIME
India’s approach to the international nuclear non-
proliferation regime has varied substantially over 
time and is generally linked to broader developments 
in its foreign and security policy. Originally, it was 
dominated by a high degree of idealism. Particularly 
under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s 
first Prime Minister from 1947 to 1964, India was 
characterized by a general aversion to nuclear weapons 
and its outspoken criticism of the nuclear rivalry 
between the Soviet Union and the United States. It 
was also the first country to propose a ban on nuclear 
tests in 1954 and supported the entry-into-force of 
the Partial Test Ban Treaty nine years later. India’s 
own nuclear activity was confined largely to research 
on nuclear energy, which it saw as crucial element of 
its economic development. In this context, it became 
2  Allen, D., ‘The EU and India: strategic partners but not a strategic 
partnership’, eds T. Christiansen, E. Kirchner and P. B. Murray, 
The Palgrave Handbook of EU–Asia Relations (Palgrave Macmillan: 
Basingstoke, 2013), pp. 571–86.
one of the founding members of the IAEA.3 However, 
the first nuclear test by China, India’s regional rival, 
and Nehru’s death in 1964 encouraged debates about 
India’s nuclear policy. In the context of a broader 
reorientation of Indian foreign policies towards a 
more outspoken realpolitik, the development of Indian 
nuclear weapons became a real option.4 Furthermore, 
India refused to sign and ratify the key treaty of the 
international nuclear non-proliferation regime, the 
1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), even though it 
contributed actively to the debates about the treaty. Its 
main criticism of the NPT—and the regime that was 
subsequently built around it—was the discrimination 
between nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ as enshrined 
in Article IX, which recognizes only those nuclear-
weapon states—China, France, the Soviet Union, the 
United Kingdom and the USA—that exploded a nuclear 
device prior to 1 January 1967. In other words, India 
saw a problem of sovereign inequality or, in abstract 
terms, of justice within the NPT.5
Interestingly, India was far from alone in its criticism 
of the emerging nuclear non-proliferation regime. The 
continental European powers, in particular France, 
Germany and Italy, were also highly critical of the 
regime, albeit from different perspectives, as France 
turned into a nuclear weapon state in 1960 and the 
other two nations chose not to pass the nuclear-weapon 
threshold.6 It was only in 1975 that Germany and 
Italy ratified the NPT, and France acceded only in 
1992.7 However, these European states have since 
integrated fully within the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime and have become its staunchest defenders. 
In contrast, India followed a radically different path. 
First, in 1974, it conducted its first nuclear explosion, 
3  Perkovich, G., India’s Nuclear Bomb: the Impact on Global 
Proliferation (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1999).
4  Ganguly, S., ‘India’s pathway to Pokhran II: the prospects and 
sources of New Delhi’s nuclear weapons program’, International 
Security, vol. 23, no. 4 (1999), pp. 149–61.
5  Fey, M., et al., ‘Established and rising great powers: the United 
States, Russia, China, and India’, eds H. Müller and C. Wunderlich, 
Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control: Interests, Conflicts, and 
Justice (University of Georgia Press: Athens, GA, 2013), pp. 191–94.
6  Schrafstetter, S. and Twigge, S., Avoiding Armageddon: Europe, the 
United States, and the Struggle for Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 1945–1970 
(Praeger: Westport, CT, 2004).
7  Germany and Italy ratified under the condition that a common 
European nuclear option be kept open. Häckel, E., Die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland und der Atomwaffensperrvertrag: Rückblick und Ausblick 
[The Federal Republic of Germany and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty: retrospective view and outlook], Arbeitspapiere zur 
Internationalen Politik 53 (Bonn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige 
Politik e.V.), p. 81.
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international efforts aimed at strengthening the global 
regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons’.11
However, the tests in 1998 were not only the starting 
point of a more pronounced nuclear rivalry in South 
Asia, but also a turning point in India’s approach to 
the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Whereas India 
had been one of the most persistent opponents of the 
nuclear regime in its entirety, it began to advocate for 
its gradual inclusion in the regime as a nuclear-weapon 
state. This new approach reflected broader shifts in 
Indian foreign policy since the end of the cold war, 
according to which liberal ideas about prosperity, 
economic progress and international interdependence 
came to dominate classical ideas of idealism, realpolitik 
and, more recently, Hindu nationalism.12 The result has 
been a much more pragmatic foreign policy, in which 
India has become a more collaborative player in the 
international system and a more cooperative negotiator 
in international institutions.13 In the nuclear sphere, 
this has found its expression in the increasing emphasis 
on India being a responsible nuclear power.14 Indian 
policymakers have highlighted, in particular, that India 
has never contributed to the nuclear proliferation of 
other states and, technically, has never violated any of 
the treaties or agreements of the international nuclear 
non-proliferation regime that it has signed up to. India 
also has an explicit no-first-use nuclear-weapon policy 
and has shown notable restraint—albeit also due to 
technical and financial difficulties—in the production 
of nuclear warheads.15 However, it should be noted 
that this does not negate the fact that India has 
remained largely outside the existing political and legal 
frameworks in the nuclear field, and that its acquisition 
of nuclear weapons was highly problematic for the 
nuclear regime.
Nevertheless, the USA has become a powerful 
partner for India, and has shown itself to be willing 
to take a much more pragmatic stance on India’s 
acceptance within the existing nuclear non-
11  United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172 (1998), 6 June 
1998, p. 1.
12  Sagar, R., ‘State of mind: what kind of power will India become?’, 
International Affairs, vol. 85, no. 4 (2009), pp. 801–16.
13  Mukherjee, R. and Malone, D. M., ‘Indian foreign policy and 
contemporary security challenges’, International Affairs, vol. 87, no. 1 
(2011), pp. 87–104.
14  Sasikumar, K., ‘India’s emergence as a “responsible” nuclear 
power’, International Journal, vol. 62, no. 4, (2007), pp. 825–44.
15  It is estimated that India has around 120 operational warheads. 
Kristensen, H. M. and Norris, R. S., ‘Global nuclear weapons inventories, 
1945–2013’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 69, no. 5 (2013), p. 76.
officially describing it as a peaceful nuclear explosion, 
although it is generally considered to have been a 
nuclear-weapon test. Crucially, with this test India 
became the first de facto nuclear weapon state that is 
not recognized by the NPT. At the same time, it was 
cut off from all types of nuclear trade and became 
virtually a nuclear pariah state. India’s actions also 
led to the creation of what came to be known as the 
NSG, which has tried to control nuclear exports in 
order to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear 
weapons.8 Second, India has developed an alternative 
vision for another international nuclear regime based 
on sovereign equality between all states and the 
gradual elimination of all nuclear weapons. One of 
the most well-known formulations of this vision is the 
so-called Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan, which the Indian 
Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, presented to the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1988.9 Crucially, however, 
India’s commitment to nuclear disarmament is based 
on simultaneous disarmament by all nuclear-weapon 
states and does not entail the possibility of unilateral 
disarmament.
In the 1990s India remained largely outside the 
existing international nuclear non-proliferation 
regime. Most notably, it failed to sign and ratify the 
1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), 
even though—almost ironically—it was the first state 
to propose a ban on nuclear testing back in 1954. When 
the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party came to 
power in 1998, India conducted its first official nuclear-
weapon tests the same year and formally declared 
itself a nuclear-weapon state.10 Only a few days later, 
Pakistan, India’s arch-rival, responded by conducting 
its first nuclear-weapon tests, thus becoming another 
nuclear-weapon state that is not recognized by the 
NPT. This was particularly problematic as all future 
conflicts between the two countries from then on 
pitched two nuclear-weapon states against each 
other, as happened during the 1999 Kargil War in the 
mountainous northern Indo–Pakistani border area. 
Not surprisingly, the Indian and Pakistani tests were 
harshly criticized by the international community and 
grave concern was expressed in UN Security Council 
Resolution 1172 ‘at the challenge that the nuclear tests 
conducted by India and then by Pakistan constitute to 
8  Nuclear Suppliers Group, ‘History’, [n.d.], <http://www.
nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/history1>.
9  Fey et al. (note 5), pp. 189–90; and Ganguly (note 4), p. 164.
10  Ganguly (note 4), pp. 170–75.
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proliferation regime without the need to give up its 
nuclear weapons. Under the administration of US 
President Bill Clinton, India and the USA intensified 
their bilateral relations and began to normalize a 
historically strained relationship. Opening up nuclear 
trade between the two countries, which had been 
suspended since India’s nuclear test in 1974, formed 
one of the cornerstones of this rapprochement.16 
This process culminated in the 2005 India–US joint 
statement, in which US President George W. Bush 
promised to ‘work with friends and allies to adjust 
international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy 
cooperation and trade with India’.17 In other words, the 
statement effectively foresaw the end of India’s nuclear 
isolation. As one scholar has argued:
The US–India pact is recognition by the US of 
the rising global profile of India and an attempt 
to carve out a strategic partnership with a 
nation with which it shares not only a range of 
significant interests but also a whole range of 
political and cultural values.18
Although proponents of the India–US nuclear 
rapprochement brought out the ‘heavy artillery’ in 
the ensuing public debate—from India’s strategic 
importance as a counterbalance to China, to India’s 
need for ‘clean’ nuclear energy for its economic 
development—key constituents of the US political 
system were still not convinced of the need for an 
India–US nuclear agreement. As such a nuclear trade 
agreement—a so-called 123 Agreement—also requires 
congressional approval, the US Congress became 
the main battleground between supporters and 
opponents.19 In this respect, the most controversial 
issue was the need to make India an exception to some 
of the requirements of a traditional 123 Agreement, 
such as full-scope safeguards. Ultimately, the US 
Congress adopted the so-called Hyde Act of 2006 that 
allowed the US President to waive 123 Agreement 
16  Pant, H. V., ‘The US– India nuclear deal: the beginning of a 
beautiful relationship?’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs,  
vol. 20, no. 3 (2007), pp. 455–72.
17  The White House, ‘Joint statement between President George W. 
Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’, Press release, 18 July 2005, 
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ 
releases/2005/07/20050718-6.html>.
18  Pant (note 16), p. 469.
19  Office of the General Counsel, US Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, sec. 123, <http://www.nrc.gov/
about-nrc/governing-laws.html>.
requirements under certain conditions. Apart from 
a large number of conditions regarding political 
procedures in the USA and concrete measures to be 
taken by India, the US Congress demanded that India 
conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA for its 
civilian nuclear programme (to be separated from its 
military programme) and that the NSG allow nuclear 
exports to India by adapting its export guidelines.20 
It is in this context that the two major issues in the 
debate about India’s integration into the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime emerged in the second half of 
the 2000s: (a) the NSG waiver; and (b) a special IAEA 
safeguards agreement. 
US diplomats made relentless efforts to turn these 
issues into reality.21 However, they encountered stiff 
opposition from a number of IAEA and NSG member 
states that believed that nuclear trade should only be 
available for those states that are integral members of 
the key treaties and agreements of the international 
nuclear non-proliferation regime, in particular the 
NPT. Therefore, it was not until August 2008—three 
years after the India–US joint statement—that the 
IAEA adopted a special Indian safeguards agreement. 
The agreement put India’s civilian installations under 
IAEA control but left out the installations that were 
deemed to play a military role—a privilege usually 
reserved for the five nuclear-weapon states recognized 
by the NPT (although it remains unclear whether 
certain installations, in particular of the Indian nuclear 
fuel cycle, can be classified as only civilian or military). 
Shortly afterwards, the NSG approved a special waiver 
for India, which for the first time allowed nuclear 
trade with a state that developed nuclear weapons 
outside the nuclear non-proliferation regime and that 
has never signed or ratified the NPT. In this way, in 
principle, India gained two important privileges of 
official nuclear-weapon states without significant 
implications for its own nuclear-weapon programme: 
(a) the separation of nuclear installations in terms 
of safeguards; and (b) the (potential) opening up of 
nuclear trade. In other words, India was treated, for 
the first time, as if it were an official nuclear-weapon 
state, even though it developed its nuclear weapons 
in contravention of the existing regime framework. 
Arguably, this political recognition as both a nuclear-
20  Weiss, L., ‘US–India nuclear cooperation’, The Nonproliferation 
Review, vol. 14, no. 3 (2007), pp. 439–44.
21  Kerr, P. K., US Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress, 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL33016, 26 June 
2012, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33016.pdf>.
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full implementation.25 The WMD Strategy specifically 
points out that ‘effective multilateralism is the 
cornerstone of the European strategy for combating 
proliferation of WMD’ and the NPT is the key treaty 
that is repeatedly referred to.26 It comes, therefore, as 
no surprise that all EU member states are also members 
of virtually all key institutions and agreements in the 
area of nuclear non-proliferation.27 The EU and its 
member states have also made significant contributions 
to the development of new instruments of the 
broader regime, such as the Hague Code of Conduct 
against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. Moreover, 
they have actively supported the work of a number of 
international non-proliferation institutions. The EU 
has adopted over half-a-dozen joint actions and, since 
the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, European Council decisions 
have provided financial support worth more than 
€70 million to institutions such as the IAEA and the 
Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization. 
In this way, the EU has strengthened the treaty 
verification capabilities of the CTBT, improved the 
nuclear security work of the IAEA, contributed to 
the strengthening of IAEA safeguards and promoted 
the accession to international non-proliferation 
agreements through workshops with non-members.28
The EU’s firm commitment to the existing formal 
non-proliferation regime is different from India’s 
stance in many respects. Apart from its historical 
membership in the IAEA, India has not joined any 
of the institutions or agreements that are generally 
considered key elements of the regime. It has also 
refused to sign any kind of political agreement that 
would entail the EU’s so-called non-proliferation 
clause, the EU’s key instrument to promote universal 
membership in the regime, and in particular its core 
element, the NPT.29 In fact, India’s rejection of the 
25  For an overview of the main documents see European 
External Action Service, ‘Main documents’, <http://eeas.europa.eu/
non-proliferation-and-disarmament/documentation/documents/
index_en.htm>.
26  Council of the European Union, ‘Fight against the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction: EU Strategy against Proliferation 
of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, 15708/03, 10 Dec. 2003, <http://
europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_policy/
cfsp_and_esdp_implementation/l33234_en.htm>.
27  For minor exceptions see Kienzle and Vestergaard (note 1), p. 376.
28  Kienzle, B., ‘A European contribution to non-proliferation? The 
EU WMD Strategy at ten’, International Affairs, vol. 89, no. 5 (2013),  
pp. 1143–59.
29  The clause was adopted by the EU in 2003 and must be included in 
the EU’s so-called mixed agreements with third countries. It consists of 
two parts: the first is binding for the contracting parties and refers to the 
existing obligations under international non-proliferation agreements; 
weapon state and a global power was a key motivation 
for India.22 As one analyst remarked: ‘India seems to 
be eating its cake and having it too,’ pointing to the fact 
that India receives the benefits of a nuclear weapon 
state without the need to disarm.23
This does not mean that India offered no concessions 
at all. It did offer a unilateral nuclear-test moratorium, a 
commitment to the negotiation of a fissile material cut-
off treaty (FMCT) and the harmonization of its export 
controls in line with the guidelines of the NSG and the 
Missile Technology Control Regime. However, these 
concessions have hardly settled India’s complicated 
relationship with the nuclear non-proliferation regime. 
There are still a number of outstanding issues that, 
sooner or later, will dominate the non-proliferation 
agenda. In the short term, one of the most prominent 
issues will be India’s full membership in the NSG.24 
Likewise, India’s policies in the main crises of the 
non-proliferation regime—regarding the nuclear 
programmes of Iran and North Korea—will play a 
role. In the medium term, India’s commitment to the 
negotiation of an FMCT will also be an important topic 
for debate. A final outstanding issue is the signing and 
ratification of the CTBT. In sum, as a non-member of 
all institutions and agreements of the non-proliferation 
regime—with the exception of the IAEA—India’s push 
for further integration within the regime will certainly 
provoke numerous debates in years to come.
III. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S INDIAN DILEMMA
The international nuclear non-proliferation regime 
has been the focal point of the EU’s emerging 
non-proliferation policy, both rhetorically and 
in practice. The EU’s key documents in the area 
of non-proliferation consistently highlight the 
importance of the regime in the fight against the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, with ‘effective 
multilateralism’ being the common European rallying 
call—‘effective’ meaning universal participation and 
22  Paul, T. V. and Shankar, M., ‘Why the US–India nuclear accord is a 
good deal’, Survival, vol. 49, no. 4 (2007), pp. 112–14.
23  Narlikar, A., ‘Peculiar chauvinism or strategic calculation? 
Explaining the negotiating strategy of a rising India’, International 
Affairs, vol. 82, no. 1 (2006), p. 76.
24  ‘India’s quest for atomic trade group membership faces hurdles: 
expert’, Global Security Newswire, 28 July 2014, <http://www.nti.org/
gsn/article/indias-pursuit-nuclear-suppliers-group-membership-
faces-many-hurdles-expert/>.
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waive this requirement when they opened up nuclear 
trade with India in 2008. Yet, as this is a privilege 
that has not been granted to any of the unrecognized 
nuclear-weapon states, the waiver was a very 
controversial move, as exemplified by the divisions on 
the issue among EU member states. Second, with the 
support of the USA, the UK and other states, India has 
also put its full membership in the NSG on the agenda. 
Although NPT membership is not a formal requirement 
for joining the NSG, India would be the first member 
that is a nuclear-weapon state not recognized by 
the NPT. Ironically, the NSG was also originally 
set up as a reaction to India’s first nuclear test (see 
above). So, India’s membership is, once more, a highly 
controversial issue.
The one treaty that India could join without any 
major legal repercussions is the CTBT. There have 
even been tentative indications that it might be willing 
to join under certain circumstances, but so far it 
has officially rejected this idea. India criticizes, in 
particular, potential loopholes in the treaty, for example 
the possibility to simulate nuclear-test explosions on 
a computer. As these kinds of loopholes mainly benefit 
the established nuclear-weapon states with advanced 
technological capabilities, India argues that the CTBT 
still discriminates between different types of state.33 
CTBT membership would also legally cement India’s 
hitherto voluntary nuclear-test moratorium. In the 
future, India’s commitment to the negotiation of an 
FMCT may also play a more prominent role. Although 
the substantive negotiations of such a treaty in the UN 
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva have stalled for 
a long time, the resumption of the negotiations at some 
point in the future will reveal India’s real commitment. 
Formally, its commitment appears to be strong: 
India’s support for FMCT negotiations in the CD 
is consistent with our interest in strengthening 
the global non-proliferation regime that would 
add a measure of strategic predictability and a 
baseline for future global nuclear disarmament 
efforts.34 
However, there are indicators that question the 
extent to which India is willing to compromise to join 
an FMCT. In contrast to the official nuclear-weapon 
33  See e.g. Ganguly (note 4), pp. 169–70.
34  UN Office at Geneva, ‘Statement by India on FMCT in the CD 
Plenary’, 12 Mar. 2013.
clause was an important blow to the EU’s efforts to deal 
with difficult cases in the non-proliferation regime. The 
crux of the matter is the NPT itself. Since the treaty is 
very specific regarding which states can be recognized 
as nuclear weapon states—and India-specific reforms of 
the treaty can be excluded as completely unrealistic—
India can never join as a nuclear-weapon state, even if 
it wanted to, as suggested a few years ago by the Indian 
Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh.30 At the same time, 
India’s unilateral nuclear disarmament to join the NPT 
is equally utopian.31 The only way out is a new key 
treaty that supersedes the NPT—for instance, a nuclear 
weapons convention similar to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention that outlaws the development, production, 
acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer or use of 
chemical weapons. However, such a convention is 
still confined to the realm of pipe dreams. In short, 
India will stay outside the main framework of the 
international nuclear non-proliferation regime for the 
foreseeable future.
This has important implications for the two nuclear 
export control regimes, the Zangger Committee 
and the NSG.32 Traditionally, the informal Zangger 
Committee has been directly linked to the NPT, 
in particular the interpretation of export control 
provisions entailed in Article III. Consequently, 
Indian participation or even membership is a non-
issue. Moreover, the NSG has taken over many of the 
Zangger Committee’s responsibilities over the years, 
thus turning into the principal nuclear export control 
group. It is regarding this group that India has played, 
and will play in the future, the most controversial 
role. First, since the 1992 NSG Plenary in Warsaw, 
one of the key requirements to allow nuclear exports 
is a comprehensive safeguards agreement between 
the IAEA and the recipient state. However, these 
agreements have been designed for non-nuclear-
weapon states. Consequently, NSG members had to 
the second is largely declaratory and promotes the ratification of non-
proliferation agreements by the contracting parties. Quille, G., ‘The EU 
and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction’, eds S. Biscop 
and R. G. Whitman, The Routledge Handbook of European Security 
(Routledge: London, 2013), p. 240.
30  Fidler, D. P. and Ganguly, S., ‘India wants to join the Non-
Proliferation Treaty as a weapon state’, YaleGlobal Online, 27 Jan. 
2010, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/india-wants-join-non-
proliferation-treaty>.
31  Nayan, R., ‘The NPT and India: accommodating the exception’, 
Strategic Analysis, vol. 34, no. 2 (2010), pp. 309–21.
32  Nayan, R., ‘Integrating India with the global export controls 
system: challenges ahead’, Strategic Analysis, vol. 35, no. 3 (2011),  
pp. 439–51.
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international player that is increasingly difficult to 
ignore.37 If such a rising actor remains unsatisfied 
outside important international regimes, its growing 
power may weaken the stability of the regimes 
themselves. Unlike other rising powers (such as Brazil, 
Russia, China and South Africa) India has never been a 
part of the non-proliferation regime, and it has means 
at its disposal that make the proper functioning of the 
regime difficult—as shown by its nuclear tests in 1973 
and 1998. As T. V. Paul and Mahesh Shankar argue, ‘an 
unsatisfied growing power does not augur well for the 
stability of the system, and such a state is likely to try its 
utmost to undermine or provoke restructuring of the 
regime’.38 Likewise, supporters can point to India’s own 
arguments that it is an exceptional case in comparison 
with the other nuclear-weapon states outside the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime. Apart from being a 
rising power, India is an established democracy with 
a consistent track record of control over its nuclear 
installations, material and technology. In other words, 
it has behaved as responsibly as could be expected from 
a regular member of the regime and should, therefore, 
be included. Furthermore, India’s inclusion in the 
regime would raise the costs of non-compliance with 
key regime elements in the future. For example, if it 
chooses to conduct another nuclear test, India might 
once again lose its access to international nuclear trade.
The sceptical states highlight the fact that it is not 
possible to integrate India within the nuclear non-
proliferation regime without breaking the regime’s 
basic rules, enshrined in particular in the NPT.39 In 
essence, the NPT is a big trade-off whereby the non-
nuclear-weapon states give up their nuclear-weapon 
options and, in turn, the nuclear-weapon states 
guarantee their right to civilian nuclear energy and 
promise to initiate nuclear disarmament processes 
in the long-term. Any deviation from this trade-off 
could endanger the delicate balance on which the 
NPT is based. In other words, if India is included 
in key elements of the non-proliferation regime 
without giving up its nuclear weapons—and reaps the 
corresponding benefits, for example, in terms of nuclear 
trade—non-nuclear-weapon states may be encouraged 
to develop their own nuclear-weapon programmes, 
as they can expect, over time, the acceptance of their 
37  Narlikar, A., ‘Is India a responsible great power?’, Third World 
Quarterly, vol. 32, no. 9 (2011), p. 1607; and Perkovich, G., ‘Is India a major 
power?’, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 1 (2003), pp. 129–44.
38  Paul and Shankar (note 23), p. 111.
39  See Weiss (note 21), pp. 429–57.
states, it has still not declared a moratorium on its 
own fissile material production. It also emphasizes 
the need for any treaty to be in line with its national 
security interests. Furthermore, there are a number of 
controversial issues that may not be resolved during  
the substantive negotiations of an FMCT, for example, 
establishing a link between such a treaty and the fight 
against nuclear terrorism, which India rejects.35
From a European perspective, these developments 
have brought about a highly problematic Indian 
strategy of selective integration within the different 
institutions and agreements of the international 
nuclear non-proliferation regime. That is, India is eager 
to join the export control groups, where it can expect 
important gains in economic terms, but it is much more 
wary about joining other agreements such as the CTBT 
that impose political conditions on member states. This 
has led to prolonged debates between those states that 
are generally in favour of India’s strategy and those 
that are largely opposed. Although states including 
the USA, Russia, Brazil, China and New Zealand have 
expressed varying positions and opinions, the EU can 
be seen as a microcosm of the debates about India’s 
relationship with the nuclear non-proliferation regime. 
In abstract terms, there are at least three major groups 
of member states: (a) the firm supporters of India, 
above all France and the UK; (b) the neutral states 
that do not have an outspoken policy on India and the 
non-proliferation regime, either because it falls outside 
the priorities of their foreign and security policy (e.g. 
Luxembourg) or because it is internally divided on the 
issue (e.g. Germany); and (c) those states that are much 
more sceptical, in particular Austria and Ireland. The 
dilemma for the EU as a whole is that all sides use very 
convincing, but certainly not compatible, arguments. 
In other words, there is no ‘silver bullet’ that will solve 
the problem of India’s integration within the non-
proliferation regime.
The supporters of India’s integration within the 
non-proliferation regime emphasize India’s growing 
power.36 Although it is arguably still too early to claim 
that it is a ‘great power’, India’s political, economic 
and cultural weight has turned it into a formidable 
35  Nayan, R., ‘India and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty: policy 
options’, Strategic Analysis, vol. 35, no. 1 (2010), pp. 38–40.
36  See e.g. Paul and Shankar (note 23), pp. 111–22; and Rauch, 
C., ‘Hushed hope: India, the nuclear deal, and nonproliferation’, 
Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Working Paper no. 7 
(2010), <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/
carstenrauchandhushedhope4ea15de902194.pdf>.
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beginnings, formal EU–India relations have progressed 
very slowly. Most notably, today these relations are still 
governed by the 1994 Cooperation Agreement between 
the European Community and the Republic of India 
on partnership and development, basically a standard 
economic cooperation agreement. In fact, the bulk of 
EU–India relations are economic rather than political.
Since 2000 the EU has tried to boost the relationship 
with regular annual summits between the EU and 
India, in which the two parties exchange views at the 
highest level on different aspects of mutual concern, 
including non-proliferation. At the 2004 EU–India 
Summit in The Hague, the EU–India Strategic 
Partnership was launched in order to upgrade 
existing commercial relations with a more explicit 
political dimension in the area of peace and security 
and intensified ties in research, technology and 
culture. The following year, the two parties adopted 
the so-called Joint Action Plan to operationalize the 
Strategic Partnership. However, progress has been 
modest at best. Especially tangible outcomes in the 
realm of international security have been rather a 
matter of European wishful thinking than facts on 
the ground. Not surprisingly, most analysts have been 
very critical of the partnership, with one concluding 
that it ‘mainly remained symbolic’.41 A notable failure 
was the refusal of India to negotiate a formal bilateral 
political agreement with the EU, which would include 
the EU’s conditionality clauses, among others on non-
proliferation.
The cumbersome interaction between India and the 
EU in security matters is a reflection of the perceived 
mismatch of two very distinct foreign and security 
policy actors. In Indian policy circles, the visibility of 
the EU as an international actor is generally low.42 It 
is seen, if at all, as a trade bloc without a significant 
foreign and security policy of its own. Most notably, 
the EU is not believed to be in a position to offer India 
what it arguably desires most in international affairs, 
namely the status and prestige of a great power—for 
instance, in the form of a permanent seat on the UN 
41  Khandekar, G., ‘The EU and India: a loveless arranged 
marriage’, FRIDE Policy Brief no. 90, Aug. 2011, <http://www.fride.
org/download/pb_90_eu_and_india.pdf>; Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 
K., Contemporary Indian Views of Europe (Chatham House: London, 
2006); and Keukeleire, S. and Bruyninckx, H., ‘The European Union, 
the BRICs, and the emerging new world order’, eds C. Hill and M. 
Smith, International Relations and the European Union, 2nd ed. (Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, 2011), p. 388.
42  Jain, R. K. and Pandey, S., ‘The European Union in the eyes of 
India’, Asia Europe Journal, vol. 8, no. 2 (2010), p. 207.
(potential) nuclear-weapon status by other states. 
It may also increase the general dissatisfaction with 
the existing regime—and how it has developed over 
the past 20 years—among states such as Brazil or 
Egypt. The negotiations with Iran are another case 
in point. Iran frequently brings up the India card in 
the negotiations over its nuclear programme—which 
involve France, Germany and the UK, and the 3 non-EU 
members of the UN Security Council, China, Russia 
and the USA (the E3+3)—arguing that the concessions 
to India weaken the consistency of the Western 
commitment to the integrity of the non-proliferation 
regime.40 Among states outside the regime, Pakistan’s 
nuclear policies may become more confrontational 
as it grows dissatisfied with the growing acceptance 
of its rival in the non-proliferation regime. This 
is already a stumbling block for the negotiation of 
the FMCT in the UN Conference on Disarmament, 
and would put additional pressure on EU member 
states to find consensus regarding a country where 
common positions have proven to be rather elusive (e.g. 
regarding the issue of China–Pakistan civil nuclear 
cooperation within the framework of the NSG).
All in all, the EU is confronted with two difficult 
choices. On the one hand, if India remains outside 
the regime, the effectiveness of the non-proliferation 
regime may be compromised by the exclusion of a key 
actor. Especially in the long term, India may conclude 
that it is no longer necessary to play by the rules of a 
regime from which it is continually excluded. On the 
other hand, if India is integrated, the regime’s basic 
trade-off may be thrown off balance with further 
unpredictable consequences. In other words, the 
EU is faced with a dilemma in its implementation of 
‘effective multilateralism’: between strictly adhering to 
the existing non-proliferation principles and the need 
to integrate an emerging power within multilateral 
structures.
IV. EUROPEAN RESPONSES TO INDIA’S 
CHALLENGE
The EU’s non-proliferation policy towards India forms 
part of its broader relations with India. Famously, India 
was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic 
relations with the European Economic Community 
in the early 1960s. Yet, despite these promising 
40  European External Action Service official, Interview with author, 
7 May 2013. 
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overall share has diminished recently.49 Consequently, 
most analysts concur that ‘the driving force behind 
the India–EU relations has been, is, and will continue 
to be trade and commerce’.50 Yet, even in this sphere 
progress has been slow. In the FTA negotiations, 
several deadlines have already passed and at present no 
agreement is in place.51
In sum, EU–India relations have been undermined 
by significant structural weaknesses, in particular 
the lack of formal and institutionalized relations, 
the lack of a common vision for multilateral relations 
in international affairs and a general lack of mutual 
understanding in foreign and security policy. It 
has been in this unfavourable context that EU non-
proliferation policies towards India have developed.
The lack of common policies
From the outset, EU member states had great difficulty 
establishing common European non-proliferation 
policies on India. One expert has even gone so far as 
to argue that ‘the EU has never engaged with India 
and Pakistan’s nuclear issue in any meaningful way’.52 
The EU’s non-proliferation policies have certainly 
been rather timid. The most prominent case in this 
regard is the European reaction to the nuclear tests 
in India (and Pakistan) in 1998, which demonstrates 
how difficult it has been to arrive at common policies 
in some instances.53 The EU’s non-proliferation stance 
on the South Asian nuclear test crisis is best described 
as a typical example of what has been called weak and 
slow ‘declaratory policies’. The only slightly more far-
reaching action was the EU Common Position adopted 
months after the test, which foresaw EU support for 
confidence-building measures between India and 
49  Sachdeva, G., ‘India and the European Union: broadening strategic 
partnership beyond economic linkages’, International Studies, vol. 45, 
no. 4 (2008), pp. 341–467.
50  Jain and Pandey (note 42), p. 194; Kavalski, E., ‘Venus and the 
porcupine: assessing the European Union–India Strategic Partnership’, 
South Asian Survey, vol. 15, no. 1 (2008), pp. 63–81; and Sachdeva  
(note 49), pp. 341 –467.
51  Khorana, S. and Garcia, M., ‘European Union–India trade 
negotiations: one step forward, one back?’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, vol. 51, no. 4 (2013), pp. 684–700.
52  Hassan, O., ‘Securitizing proliferation, failing security 
governance: the European Union’s role in India and Pakistan’s nuclear 
rivalry’, Asia Europe Journal, vol. 11, no. 2 (2013), p. 94.
53  Grand, C., ‘The European Union and the non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons’, Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper no. 37, 
Jan. 2000, <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ 
cp037e.pdf>; and Portela, C., European Union Sanctions and Foreign 
Policy: When and Why Do They Work? (Routledge: London, 2010).
Security Council.43 The EU’s soft-power approach 
to international affairs is perceived by India as a 
way to cement the status quo.44 Moreover, the EU’s 
emerging relationship with China, India’s Asian rival, 
has incurred India’s displeasure.45 As a major survey 
of Indian policymakers has pointed out: ‘In Indian 
diplomatic circles, there is a growing feeling that the 
European Union has chosen to favour totalitarian 
China over its democratic counterpart’.46 For their 
part, European policymakers are displeased by what 
they consider to be India’s overly strong focus on hard 
power in international affairs and the preference it 
accordingly gives to the USA.47 Even more important 
from the perspective of the non-proliferation regime 
are the different visions that India and the EU have 
of multilateralism and its future. In line with other 
rising powers, India emphasizes the need for more 
representation and, consequently, more power for the 
larger countries in the Global South, whereas the EU 
is more concerned with the functioning of existing 
international institutions. In addition, European 
policymakers are particularly irritated by India’s 
traditionally intransigent negotiation style in a large 
number of international settings. As a former diplomat 
has pointed out: 
Off the record, EU officials point out that India 
continues to be their most difficult strategic 
partner. In the eyes of many European officials, 
India has acquired a reputation of being an 
inflexible negotiator and a potential spoiler, 
unwilling to yield and adapt its positions where 
compromise seems possible.48
In recent years, interactions between the EU and 
India have focused on the one area where the relations 
have been most intense: commerce and trade, in 
particular, the negotiation of a so-called investment 
and free-trade agreement (FTA), essentially a bilateral 
trade liberalization agreement. Trade between the 
EU and India has steadily increased and today the 
EU is India’s largest trading partner, even though its 
43  Allen (note 2).
44  Lisbonne-de Vergeron (note 41), p. 9.
45  Allen (note 2).
46  Lisbonne-de Vergeron (note 41), p. 4.
47  Von Muenchow-Pohl, B., ‘India and Europe in a multipolar world’, 
The Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
May 2012, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/india_europe.pdf>,  
pp. 21, 33–34.
48  Von Muenchow-Pohl (note 47), p. 32.
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uncontroversial issues in fields such as nuclear export 
controls or, at least, avoids any type of confrontation.
What is even more important is that the EU has 
given up any discussions on the inclusion of its 
landmark non-proliferation clause in a bilateral 
agreement with India.58 In its most basic form, this 
clause would have introduced a binding element 
that commits the contracting parties to observing 
existing non-proliferation agreements and a non-
binding element urging the parties to sign and ratify 
the agreements to which they are not a state party. 
Yet, confronted with India’s categorical rejection 
of any political conditionality clauses, EU member 
states and the European Commission refrained 
from pushing a comprehensive Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement that legally requires the 
non-proliferation clause and decided to take the easy 
way forward, meaning the negotiation of an FTA that 
does not foresee the inclusion of the clause. Thus, 
they disregarded the unusually strong views on this 
issue expressed by the Personal Representative for 
non-proliferation, Annalisa Giannella, and her non-
proliferation team in the Council of the EU. In a speech 
in 2007, for example, Giannella argued that
the nuclear deal with India has raised and 
continues to raise so many questions from the 
point of view of the credibility of the NPT. We 
have here a case where a country is rewarded 
without adhering to all the rules subscribed by 
the vast majority.59 
In what was seen as an important reversal of her 
approach to the European Parliament, Giannella also 
tried to involve the Parliament in her lobbying efforts 
on behalf of the non-proliferation clause in a future 
EU–India agreement. She specifically warned the 
European Parliament about a dangerous precedent of 
double standards, to which the Parliament responded 
with the ‘Report on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction: A Role for the European Parliament’, 
declaring that it:
58  Council Common Position 2003/805/CFSP of 17 Nov. 2003 on the 
universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral agreements in the 
field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of 
delivery, Official Journal of the European Union, L302, 20 Nov. 2003.
59  Council of the European Union, ‘Speech by Mrs Annalisa 
Giannella’, Seminar on Nuclear Proliferation, Madrid, 6 Nov. 2007, 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2007-11-06_
Madrid.pdf>, p. 8.
Pakistan, for example, in the form of bilateral seminars 
and workshops, technical support for improved nuclear 
export controls, and better links with European think 
tanks in the area of non-proliferation.54 Despite these 
commendable policies, they hardly constituted a rapid 
and forceful response. Similarly, the EU response to the 
1999 Kargil War was limited to formal declarations in 
which it urged India and Pakistan to ‘show maximum 
restraint and resume the dialogue in accordance with 
bilateral commitments’.55 In the years since, even the 
EU’s declaratory policy has all but disappeared. After 
one last Presidency Declaration condemning India’s 
test of ballistic missiles in January 2002, India has 
largely fallen outside the EU’s non-proliferation radar.
The absence of India in the EU’s non-proliferation 
policy has been particularly blatant in the EU’s 
strategic documents developed after 2001. Neither 
the 2003 WMD Strategy nor the 2008 New Lines for 
Action specifically mentions India. Not surprisingly, 
little has changed regarding the 2004 Strategic 
Partnership and the corresponding Joint Action Plan. 
Apart from ‘a bilateral India–EU Security Dialogue 
at Senior Official level, which will include regular 
consultations on global and regional security issues, 
disarmament and nonproliferation’ and has led to 
an ‘exchange of views’ between the EU’s Personal 
Representative for non-proliferation and Indian 
authorities, the EU’s and India’s non-proliferation 
stances have not converged.56 Crucially, whereas the 
EU sees the NPT and the CTBT as fundamental pillars 
of the international non-proliferation order, India 
rejects the logic behind the treaties and refuses to sign 
them. Usually the EU urges India to sign and ratify 
treaties such as the NPT but, according to  
R. K. Jain, one of the few Indian EU experts, ‘No one 
takes them [the EU] seriously’.57 Consequently, the 
non-proliferation dialogue with India focuses on 
54  Common Position 98/606/CFSP of 26 Oct. 1998 defined by the 
Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union 
on the European Union’s contribution to the promotion of non-
proliferation and confidence-building in the South Asian region, Official 
Journal of the European Communities, L290, 29 Oct. 1998.
55  ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union 
on Kashmir’, <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PESC-99-
64_en.htm>.
56  Council of the European Union, ‘The India–EU Strategic 
Partnership Joint Action Plan’, 11984/05 (Presse 223), Brussels, 7 Sep. 
2005, p. 6.
57  Quoted in Hughes, K., ‘More than trade relations?’, European 
Voice, 7 Mar. 2007, <http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/more-
than-trade-relations/>.
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reluctant to punish India in any substantive way.63 
France even criticized the sanctions that were imposed 
by the USA.64 However, it is noteworthy that, just 
three years later, all EU member states had lifted their 
most substantive sanctions, suggesting that European 
divisions are not necessarily long-lasting.
In the following years, India—with the crucial 
support of the USA—stepped up its efforts to integrate 
more fully within the non-proliferation regime, using 
a sophisticated discourse that emphasized its role as a 
responsible nuclear power that has never contributed 
to nuclear proliferation in other states; the largest 
democracy in the developing world; and an emerging 
power to be reckoned with.65 Supportive states easily 
bought into this discourse and began to reiterate and, 
thus, reinforce it. In this way, they helped to cement the 
view that India was a special case that deserved special 
treatment in the non-proliferation regime. In other 
words, supportive states smoothed the way for the NSG 
waiver and the special IAEA safeguards agreement in 
2008. They also had substantial commercial interests 
in the waiver and the safeguards agreement, as these 
made nuclear trade with India possible in the first place 
(see table 1). In addition, support for the waiver and the 
safeguards agreement was also seen as way to secure 
lucrative commercial deals with India outside the 
nuclear field (e.g. in the aviation or military technology 
sectors).
Although the supportive countries (e.g. France and 
the UK) quickly won over numerous largely neutral 
countries in the EU and increased the support for 
the NSG waiver and the special IAEA safeguards 
agreement, a small number of countries (Austria and 
Ireland, in particular) resisted for over three years. It 
was only the combination of US and Indian pressure, 
the direct support of the IAEA Director General, 
Mohamed ElBaradei, the promise of an Indian test 
moratorium and the existence of an overwhelming 
number of states in favour that induced Austria, Ireland 
and other sceptical countries to agree not to oppose the 
waiver and the special safeguards agreement.66 Given 
these very different European approaches to India 
in important non-proliferation matters, it does not 
63  Portela (note 53).
64  Hassan (note 52), p. 98.
65  Sasikumar (note 14), pp. 825–44.
66  Kienzle, B., ‘The exception to the rule? The EU and India’s 
challenge to the non-proliferation norm’, European Security 
(forthcoming), <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/ 
10.1080/09662839.2014.948863#.VC0uJUNsLEs>.
Welcomes the inclusion of clauses concerning 
non-proliferation of WMD in the latest European 
Union agreements with third countries and 
action plans; points out, however, that such 
measures must be strictly implemented by all the 
Union’s partners without exception; therefore 
calls for a speedy revision of existing agreements 
and action plans that lack such a clause.60 
However, these initiatives were ultimately to no 
avail.61 
Finally, the most recent Indian policy challenges in 
the area of non-proliferation, in particular the special 
IAEA safeguards agreement and the NSG waiver 
for India, have hardly brought about a more forceful 
common European policy output. On the contrary, 
despite early attempts to forge a common European 
position on these issues in the Council Working Party 
on Non-Proliferation (CONOP), European member 
states could not agree and the discussions in CONOP 
have largely remained as information exchanges that 
have not led to a convergence of national positions.62 
Since 2006 India has virtually disappeared from EU 
non-proliferation policies. Even the biannual progress 
reports of the WMD Strategy have barely mentioned 
India—let alone the India–US nuclear agreement.
National policies and the potential for more common 
policies
The lack of common EU policies has not precluded 
strong European responses in the form of national 
policies towards India. In fact, the period between 
the 1998 nuclear weapon tests and the adoption of the 
NSG waiver in India shows how both the supporters 
of India in the EU and the more sceptical countries 
implemented significant policies of their own, thus 
highlighting marked differences within the EU during 
this ten-year period. In the aftermath of the 1998 tests, 
some EU member states imposed harsh sanctions on 
India, for instance, suspending foreign development 
aid, whereas other member states were much more 
60  European Parliament, ‘European Parliament resolution on 
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: a role for the 
European Parliament (2005/2139(INI))’, P6_TA(2005)0439, Strasbourg, 
17 Nov. 2005, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.
do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2005-0439&language=EN>.
61  European Parliament official and Member of Parliament, 
Interviews with author, 26–27 Jan. 2009.
62  European External Action Service official, Interview with author, 
26 Mar. 2013.
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approach possible at an early stage. For instance, during 
the debates about the NSG waiver, all EU member 
states should have pushed (from the outset) for tighter 
supervision of the implementation of India’s promises, 
such as the nuclear-test moratorium. This would make 
the European position in negotiations with India much 
stronger and would potentially strengthen the non-
proliferation regime, as outlined below.
V. BEYOND 2008: OPTIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN 
UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES
India is likely to remain a high-profile challenge to the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime in the foreseeable 
future and if the EU wants to be a credible actor in 
the field of non-proliferation it cannot eschew this 
issue. In the short term, the most pressing item on 
the agenda is the potential Indian membership in the 
NSG and possibly other export control groups.69 As in 
the case of the NSG waiver, the main challenge is to 
integrate India within the NSG and, thus, the broader 
non-proliferation regime without quite breaking the 
regime’s fundamental rules. In essence, India would 
be the NSG’s first nuclear-weapon state member that is 
not recognized by the NPT. Although NPT ratification 
is not a formal requirement for NSG membership, 
Indian membership would reward an unrecognized 
nuclear-weapon state with the benefits and privileges 
of membership without the need to give up its nuclear 
69  ‘India’s quest for atomic trade group membership faces hurdles: 
expert’ (note 24).
come as a surprise that, as a study on the perceptions 
of Indian policymakers suggests, ‘for many Indians, 
Europe’s internal divisions impede its external clout 
and its ability to emerge as a credible entity in the 
international arena’.67 At the same time, Indian policies 
also reinforce the divisions in Europe, as they always 
give preference to the development of their bilateral 
relations with European states, especially its main 
trading partners, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands and the UK.68
However, in the period 1998–2008, EU member 
states ultimately took very similar decisions on India 
in the area of non-proliferation, even though they may 
not have agreed on the substance. First, within three 
years no major European sanctions against India were 
left in place. Second, all EU countries accepted that a 
future EU–India agreement would not include the EU 
non-proliferation clause. Third, all EU member states 
accepted the NSG waiver and the special safeguards 
agreement for India. In short, there appears to be 
(unexploited) room for compromise and a common 
European approach to India that goes beyond the 
traditional declaratory policies. To this end, the 
sceptical countries would have to recognize their 
limited influence and open up to compromise much 
earlier. The other group of states, in turn, would have 
to take some of the previously outlined concerns of the 
sceptical countries more seriously and offer important 
concessions that would make a common European 
67  Lisbonne-de Vergeron (note 41), p. 17.
68  Khorana and Garcia (note 51), p. 686.
Table 1. Nuclear cooperation agreements between India and selected EU member states
Country Agreement Date
Czech Republic Economic cooperation agreement signed, opening up 
cooperation in the construction of nuclear-power plants.
8 June 2010
France Arrangement allowing India to import French nuclear fuel 
and technology.




United Kingdom Joint Declaration on civilian nuclear cooperation.
UK Government formally allows nuclear exports to India.
The Times reports the possible involvement of Sercob and 
Rolls-Royceb in the construction of the largest Indian 
nuclear-power plant.
15 Feb. 2010 
28 July 2010
21 Feb. 2011
a French state-owned nuclear technology company.
b British industrial company.
Sources: BBC Monitoring South Asia; Global Security Newswire; and International Herald Tribune.
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integrating India within the NPT as a nuclear-weapon 
state is too controversial for EU member states.71 
Therefore, it would be much more productive to push 
less problematic but still crucial issues on the non-
proliferation agenda.
First, EU member states should seek a stronger 
Indian commitment to the end of nuclear testing than 
promised in its nuclear-test moratorium as part of 
the NSG waiver deal. In other words, India should be 
strongly encouraged to commit to signing and ratifying 
the CTBT—as all European states have done—in 
exchange for its further integration within the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime, in particular the NSG. 
Although India still objects to CTBT membership, 
it should be the ultimate price that it has to pay for 
reaping the benefits of further integration. In turn, 
the first unofficial nuclear-weapon state joining the 
CTBT would strengthen the emerging nuclear-test-ban 
norm and, indirectly, the disarmament pillar of the 
non-proliferation regime. In this way, India’s further 
integration within the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime would still bend the non-proliferation principle 
underpinning the regime but would also reinforce 
the regime’s often-neglected disarmament principle. 
Second, EU member states could seek a stronger and 
more specific Indian commitment to the negotiation 
of an FMCT, for example, in the form of a declaration 
endorsing such a treaty without excessive caveats. 
Although Pakistan remains a stumbling block to the 
negotiation of an FMCT in the UN Conference on 
Disarmament in Geneva, concrete Indian support for 
such a treaty would ensure that India does not hide 
behind Pakistani opposition and merely pay lip service 
to a treaty that it does not really want. The promise of a 
moratorium on fissile-material production could be an 
important step in this direction.
If EU member states agree on these objectives early 
on, their combined weight and negotiating power could 
induce India to give in and secure the best possible deal 
for the non-proliferation regime. Ideally, EU member 
states could adopt a Council decision outlining these 
objectives, either specifically addressing the Indian 
case or the issue of the integration of outliers within 
the nuclear non-proliferation regime in general. 
However, the stronger informal harmonization of 
individual national positions towards these objectives, 
especially in the relevant Council working group, 
is probably more realistic. This does not mean that 
71  Fidler and Ganguly (note 30).
weapons. This would set a potentially dangerous 
precedent for other (would-be) nuclear-weapon states 
and could, consequently, undermine the stability 
of the regime. At the same time, however, it can be 
difficult to continually resist the pressure from an 
important nuclear power like India wanting to join key 
institutions of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In 
short, a remake of the debates and discussions about 
the NSG waiver between 2005 and 2008 will be on the 
non-proliferation agenda in the near future. Although 
a large number of actors will play a key role again, 
including major powers such as Brazil and China, also 
taking centre stage will be EU member states, which 
form more than half of the overall NSG membership. 
The main challenge for the EU will be to learn the right 
lessons from the divisions over the waiver and secure 
the best possible deal for the stability of the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime. This would include, in 
particular, more concrete Indian concessions in return 
for Indian NSG membership.
Given the complexity of the issues at stake, all 
actors should avoid maximalist positions and focus on 
ambitious but potentially achievable aims. On the one 
hand, the sceptical countries have to pragmatically 
accept that an actor like India cannot be excluded from 
the non-proliferation regime forever, especially if it is 
supported by major actors both inside and outside the 
EU, such as the UK and the USA. Initiatives such as 
on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons, in 
which Austria—one of the key sceptical countries—is 
centrally involved, should remain broad forums 
for discussing nuclear disarmament rather than 
creating specific hurdles for India’s inclusion in the 
non-proliferation regime.70 On the other hand, the 
generally supportive countries have to accept that 
Indian membership should not be a sure-fire success 
for India. In other words, the ultimate aim should be 
Indian NSG membership in exchange for a number of 
Indian concessions that would substantially strengthen 
the non-proliferation regime. As has been pointed 
out above, pushing the issue of Indian accession to 
the NPT is likely to be counterproductive. As India 
will not agree to nuclear disarmament in order to join 
the NPT, over-advocating NPT membership will be 
perceived as unwelcome neo-colonial lecturing by 
Western countries. Likewise, endorsing Indian ideas of 
70  Williams, H., ‘Trust and distrust in the global nuclear community’, 
Expert Comment, Chatham House, 11 Dec. 2014, <http://www.
chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/16475>.
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mechanisms more effective. In the mid- to long-term 
future, India could even host one of the regional 
CBRN Centres of Excellence promoted by the EU. 
Such low-profile security measures could be the first 
step towards closer and more meaningful security 
cooperation between the EU and India. However, this 
would require the build-up of more trust between the 
EU and India, and the mutual recognition of each other 
as important security actors. It would also require 
some sort of working arrangement with Pakistan, 
which would certainly be highly controversial. 
However, at this point there is still no interest in such 
an initiative anywhere in South Asia.
In the short term, the development of the 
relationship between India and the EU in the area of 
non-proliferation will depend to a large degree on the 
policies of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who 
swept to power in the 2014 general elections. Although 
Modi’s party, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata 
Party, was responsible for the first Indian nuclear-
weapon tests when it came to power for the first 
time in 1998, pundits largely agree that—in line with 
liberal trade ideas—the new Indian Government will 
be dominated by economic issues and closer ties with 
other major countries to the east of India, in particular 
Australia and Japan. At the same time, it could also 
adopt more confrontational policies towards China, its 
major rival to the north. In the words of one analyst, 
‘Modi’s foreign policy is likely to be a mix of nationalist-
led geopolitics and expedient geoeconomics’.73 The 
big unknown is the new administration’s approach 
to Pakistan. Although there have been debates about 
a possible Indo-Pakistani rapprochement under 
Modi, this possibility is still confined to the realm 
of speculation.74 However, beyond Pakistan, there 
are clear signs that India will continue its pragmatic 
nuclear policies and reap the benefits from the NSG 
waiver, for instance, by signing a nuclear cooperation 
agreement with Australia and pursuing a similar deal 
with Japan.75 Therefore, the most likely scenario in 
the short term is certainly the continuation of the 
status quo based on liberal trade thinking, where India 
becomes more integrated into international nuclear 
73  Sahoo, N., ‘Decoding Modi’s foreign policy’, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 23 Sep. 2014, <http://carnegieendowment.
org/2014/09/23/decoding-modi-s-foreign-policy/hpqy>.
74  Madan, T., ‘A Modi foreign policy: the knowns and unknowns’, 
Brookings, 16 May 2014, <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/
posts/2014/05/16-india-modi-foreign-policy-madan>.
75  ‘India’s nuclear diplomacy: late addition’, The Economist, 28 June 
2014. 
EU member states should make any future Indian 
integration within the non-proliferation regime 
conditional on these objectives. Given the commitment 
of some EU member states to Indian NSG membership, 
this is arguably already too late. But the objectives 
should be pursued more consistently and vigorously by 
all member states in formal negotiations—in particular 
the NSG discussions about Indian membership—and 
in the context of the security dialogue of the EU’s 
strategic partnership with India. The debates about 
the NSG waiver have shown that the lack of a strong 
and ambitious European negotiating position can lead 
to suboptimal outcomes. Although all member states 
refrained from opposing the waiver, their divisions 
prevented any specific, major Indian concessions apart 
from the voluntary nuclear-test moratorium and the 
promise to harmonize Indian export controls according 
to NSG guidelines. A united front of EU member states 
could have pushed more strongly for more concrete 
concessions, such as effective mechanisms to scrutinize 
India’s promises.
A more solid European position on India and 
non-proliferation could also form the basis for closer 
cooperation between the EU and India in areas such 
as export controls. The EU has already accumulated 
10 years’ experience in collaborating with partner 
countries on export controls, border security, 
knowledge management and other measures related to 
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) 
issues, both in the form of outreach programmes 
carried out by the German Federal Office for Economic 
Affairs and Export Control and the recently launched 
Centres of Excellence.72 Based on this experience, 
the EU and India could organize common workshops 
and seminars in which experts could exchange best 
practices and lessons learnt in generally technical areas 
of export control implementation. They could also 
exchange, for a limited period, national export control 
experts who could learn in situ from the other side. 
After all, both India and the EU are highly complex 
political systems that could easily learn from each 
other and, thus, make their respective export control 
72  Grip, L., ‘Assessing selected European Union external assistance 
and cooperation projects on WMD non-proliferation’, Non-proliferation 
Papers no. 6, EU Non-proliferation Consortium, Nov. 2011, <http://
www.nonproliferation.eu/activities/activities.phpSIPRI link>; and 
Mignone, A., ‘The European Union’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological 
and Nuclear Centres of Excellence Initiative’, Non-proliferation 
Papers no. 28, EU Non-proliferation Consortium, June 2013, <http://
www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/nonproliferationpapers/
aliciamignone51bb2aa04185e.pdf>.
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different arguments and leads to a more recognizable 
European profile in its India policy. As European 
governments have always acted in the same way at 
important junctions of EU–India relations in the 
nuclear field, there is certainly the potential for a 
common European strategy. Such a strategy can be a 
useful way out of the EU’s Indian nuclear dilemma and 
make European multilateralism more effective in the 
broad sense of making the functioning of the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime more effective.
Indian NPT membership, as such, is certainly 
off the table. First, India will not disarm to join the 
treaty. Second, a reform of the NPT to admit India 
as a nuclear-weapon state is not an option. This does 
not mean that the EU should give up the aim of the 
universalization of the NPT, but it would be helpful in 
any nuclear-related dialogue or negotiation with India 
to refrain from focusing on Indian NPT membership as 
a non-nuclear weapon state. However, all EU member 
states should support the desire of India and many 
other key actors (e.g. the USA) to bring India closer 
to the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime. In 
this sense, the EU has to recognize that emerging 
powers that are also regime outliers will play a more 
constructive and cooperative international role if they 
are integrated within the regime and help to shape 
its future. In particular, Indian membership in the 
NSG and the Missile Technology Control Regime are 
desirable options in the next few years, even without 
India giving up its nuclear weapons. 
This does not mean that the EU has to grant 
Indian membership freely in those elements of the 
non-proliferation regime where India mainly benefits 
from its participation. If all member states—and in 
particular countries such as France, Germany and the 
UK—work together, they can also push more strongly 
for Indian adhesion to non-proliferation agreements 
that entail important responsibilities for India without 
the need to give up its nuclear weapons. A first step 
could be a more concrete Indian commitment to the 
negotiation of an FMCT. But the crucial step must be 
the strengthening of India’s commitment to the nuclear 
test moratorium, possibly even together with Pakistan 
as an EU-sponsored confidence-building measure 
between the two nations. 
In this respect, the ultimate goal should be the 
signing and ratification of the CTBT. Although this 
treaty would put important restrictions on India’s 
nuclear-weapon programme, the EU can emphasize 
that the two European nuclear-weapon states have 
trade but does not join international non-proliferation 
agreements or institutions without relevance for 
nuclear trade. The renaissance of Indian idealism 
in the nuclear field is certainly not on the agenda. 
India’s nuclear-weapon programme continues to enjoy 
widespread support across all sections of society. In 
other words, major steps such as the ratification of the 
CTBT have to be exogenously driven, reinforcing the 
need for a strong common European position on these 
issues.
In the mid- to long-term future, European 
governments also have to contemplate more 
challenging scenarios. It is possible to imagine, for 
example, that the Indian Government comes to 
perceive the need to conduct a new series of nuclear-
weapon tests or dramatically increase the number 
of its nuclear warheads. It goes without saying that 
such a move would jeopardize India’s bilateral nuclear 
agreements, in particular with the USA, and its 
increasing integration within the non-proliferation 
regime, and recast its role in nuclear matters for 
years to come. A basic common understanding among 
EU member states on nuclear issues in India would 
certainly help to better prepare Europe for any such 
eventuality and ensure the continuing stability of the 
non-proliferation regime.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
India’s complex relationship with the international 
nuclear non-proliferation regime is an issue that defies 
easy solutions, but not one that can be ignored by the 
EU if it wants to stay at the forefront of international 
non-proliferation efforts. It also raises broader issues 
about the influence of emerging powers in international 
politics, the role of outliers in multilateralism and 
the future shape of the multilateral system. In short, 
the EU’s approach will be crucial for the future of its 
common foreign and security policy. So far, however, 
the EU has lacked a common strategic vision for India 
in the non-proliferation regime. Although EU member 
states have often ultimately acted in the same way, 
they have done so for different reasons and without 
pursuing a common policy. In short, the outcomes of 
the EU’s non-proliferation policy have largely come 
about by default and not by design. Consequently, both 
the supporting and the more sceptical EU member 
states should consider a common strategy towards 
India in the area of non-proliferation that is geared 
towards a well-balanced compromise between the 
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already taken this important step. At least India 
could offer a stronger commitment in principle to the 
CTBT objectives, similar to China and the USA, the 
two official nuclear-weapon states that have not yet 
ratified the treaty.76 India needs to accept that more 
power comes with more responsibility in international 
politics, not least in the nuclear field. It should not have 
the cake and eat it too.
76  See e.g. Zukang, S., ‘The entry into force of the CTBT: the Chinese 
perspective’, European Leadership Network, 27 Aug. 2014, <http://
www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/the-entry-into-force-of-the-
ctbt-the-chinese-perspective_1790.html>.
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ABBREVIATIONS
CBRN Chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear
CONOP Council Working Party on Non-
Proliferation
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
EU European Union
FMCT Fissile material cut-off treaty
FTA Free-trade agreement
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
UN United Nations
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
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In July 2010 the Council of the European Union decided to 
create a network bringing together foreign policy 
institutions and research centres from across the EU to 
encourage political and security-related dialogue and the 
long-term discussion of measures to combat the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 
their delivery systems.
STRUCTURE
The EU Non-Proliferation Consortium is managed jointly 
by four institutes entrusted with the project, in close 
cooperation with the representative of the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy. The four institutes are the Fondation pour 
la recherche stratégique (FRS) in Paris, the Peace Research 
Institute in Frankfurt (PRIF), the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, and Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The 
Consortium began its work in January 2011 and forms the 
core of a wider network of European non-proliferation 
think tanks and research centres which will be closely 
associated with the activities of the Consortium.
MISSION
The main aim of the network of independent non-
proliferation think tanks is to encourage discussion of 
measures to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and their delivery systems within civil society, 
particularly among experts, researchers and academics. 
The scope of activities shall also cover issues related to 
conventional weapons. The fruits of the network 
discussions can be submitted in the form of reports and 
recommendations to the responsible officials within the 
European Union.
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counter proliferation. To that end, the network can also 
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dialogues.
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